This is the history of every indigenous people in Bangladesh...which is very important for our future generation.

This book is an essential first step in the research of the Choctaw people and culture. Clara Sue Kidwell, herself a Choctaw Indian, has collected some hard-to-find but useful sources in the annotated bibilography

This is the classic work on the chronicles of the wars between the Empires of Burma and Siam during the 16th-18th Centuries. This book remains, through the great efforts of "the father of Thai history" Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, the most definte account of the wars fought between the two great empires, remaining objective by drawing from Siamese as well as Burmese sources.
The book gives a very thoroughly comprehensive and detailed account, the battles in which the warrior kings Bhureng Nong, Naresuan the Great, etc. fought and won (or in some cases lost).
It should be noted that the Thai-languaged work goes on into the wars conducted by King Taksin of Thonburi and Rama I of Rattanakosin (Bangkok) whereas the English translation ends at the Fall of Ayutthaya in 1767.
A truly great book, recommended for anyone who wants to know more about the wars of this fascinating feudal period.

Collaboratively written by Theda Perdue (professor of history, University of North Carolina) and Michael D. Green (professor of American studies, University of North Carolina), The Columbia Guide To American Indians Of The Southeast is the first in a seven-volume reference series on the history and culture of Native Americans. This fine volume is divided into four major parts: Part 1 provides an overview of cultures, history, and key points of controversy; Part 2 is an alphabetically arranged compact encyclopedia of individuals, places, major treaties and more; Part 3 is a chronology of major events; and Part 4 includes bibliographies, museums, Internet sites, addresses of tribes and much more for the fascinated reader to further his or her wisdom. A solid, heavily researched, reliable reference, fun to browse through, and superb for looking up facts, figures, and history about Native Americans of the Southeast, The Columbia Guide To American Indians Of The Southeast is a welcome, invaluable, scholarly addition to Native American studies reading lists and reference collections.

I may be a little biased but this book is great! The reason I say this is because it is written by my father's company commander. It depicts a fairly realistic idea of what my father saw for the time he was under Estep's command, but Estep did leave out some things and elaborate on others. It is an interesting book to read and it is a part of my history.

Robert Parrish has written an extraordinary book about his first tour in Vietnam advising first an ARVN Infrantry unit, then hardcore Recon/Recondo soldiers. A perfect blend of humility and incredible valor, the story includes very well developed (real) characters and examples of the versatility and extracurricular endeavours of the author.

The book gathers steam and intensity with the onset of the Tet offensive and the engagement of increasingly tougher enemy units. I totally disagree with the above editorial review that says this story, amongst other things "describes the destruction of the country by American troops"; apparently whoever wrote this did not read the book and/or has "issues" he should not bring to bear in this forum.

The action takes place in an area Northwest of Saigon in and around the city of Phu Cuong, including the Iron Triangle and an area the author calls "The Hook". Throughout the book is the uncanny impulse of the author and the troops to charge forward and attack directly, which dashes any preconceptions of the ARVN as being anything less than a committed fighting force.

You will love this book. That is all.........

A friend of mine was in the New England Resistance, but I never understood until now what he was going through in the late 1960s. Foley interviewed hundreds of draft resisters and others involved in their campaign to smash LBJ's "war machine" by filling the jails with young Americans who refused to hide out behind student deferments or CO status or to flee to Canada, and who at great peril to themselves stood up to the Pentagon and the Selective Service Act. Foley's account of the New England Resistance builds like a Greek drama, leading to the famous service in the Arlington Street Church at which hundreds of young men moved to the altar to burn their draft cards while tens of thousands of supporters stood in silence outside. I was in the crowd outside that day -- Foley's account of the Arlington Street Church service moved me to tears -- but I never understood until now that I'd witnessed the moment when the Federal Government lost its nerve. Foley captures the drama of a time of moral heroism that standard accounts of the anti-Vietnam War movement have ignored. After this book, it will never be forgotten again.

Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Corson USMC (Retired) is without a doubt one of the finest and most respected military minds in the nation. Colonel Corson passed away a few years ago but this book is a living testimony to his military genius. A combat Marine in World War II, Korea and Vietnam...the author also had a B.B.A, M.A.,and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago and the American University.

Colonel Corson has written a devastating book. In it he carefully explains how mismanagement, self-deception and corruption caused the failure of the American military effort in Vietnam. Before retiring from the Marine Corps, the author worked with both senior Pentagon officials and top White House advisors. This well-written and insightful book is an honest appraisal of a complicated subject by a special Marine officer with great vision.

Contrary Neighbors is an enjoyable and informative book for historians as well as the novice on the subject. Even with its complexity of tribal names, the writer tells a story and holds the readers interest.

My own multiple interests in organizational redesign, learning and adaptation, and national security issues led me to read this book. MAJ Nagl is an armor officer, a Rhodes Scholar, and a former instructor of International Affairs at West Point. His book, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaysia and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, discusses the way armies learn within the frameworks of the British experience with counterinsurgency in Malaya and the American experience in Vietnam. It is particularly timely as the army finds itself in a global war against shadowy networks more reminiscent of insurgencies than conventional armies. These networks have turned the "rules" upside down. Networks that can change direction at will or that can go in different directions simultaneously are not easily defeated by bureaucratic juggernauts that require fifteen years to field a new weapon system or that still apply failed tactics from thirty years ago. Victory in multiple, rapidly changing environments requires the ability to learn and to adapt and may even require differing victory conditions, organizations, and core competencies depending upon the context.

MAJ Nagl presents a twofold thesis. First, the British Army developed a successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya due to its performance as a learning institution. Second, the American Army failed to do the same in Vietnam and in fact actively resisted the necessity of learning to fight a new sort of war. But what is organizational learning? Learning theorists tend to recognize the inherently iterative nature of the learning process whether they characterize it using a simple model such as Boyd's OODA loop or Ackoff's more complex organizational learning and adaptation model. To develop his thesis, the author first looks at Richard Downie's model of the learning cycle as applied to the development of doctrine [1]. This model is more complex than the OODA cycle and less complex than some other models. Overall, Downie's model provides a reasonable framework for this study. MAJ Nagl then evaluates each army's experience using a set of questions to measure the effectiveness of each as a learning institution.

To answer these questions, the author provides a summary history of insurgency itself, a description of the historical context in which each army's organizational culture developed, and the details of the respective British and American experiences in Vietnam. He finally sums up his conclusions in a "lessons learned" chapter that provides recommendations to foster learning within the army.

Largely due to its historical context, the British army developed an organizational culture characterized by a focus on limited war, diverse, global experience, a decentralized organization, and doctrinal flexibility. In contrast, American military history led to an organizational culture focused on absolute victory, large wars characterized by technology and overwhelming firepower, and political and cultural naivete.

After establishing the historical context for these very different organizational cultures, MAJ Nagl described in detail their specific experiences in Malaya and Vietnam. The British army in Malaya went through two distinct phases in evolution as a learning institution. During the first phase, the army was still focused on its most recent experience in conventional war in World War II and Korea despite the presence of a significant number of officers with experience in "small wars". This hindered effective learning in the face of the insurgency. During the second phase, the British army developed fully as a learning organization. The key difference between these two phases was the leadership imposed by General Miles Templer and his recognition that victory meant political victory as well as operational and tactical victory. He fostered a climate of innovation that ran the gamut from free primary schooling for children of all ethnicities (Malay, Indian, and Chinese) to extensive use of intelligence, clandestine operations, and psychological warfare to the steady development of a government capable of taking over after independence. The combination of these innovations enabled the forces fighting the insurgents to truly win the "hearts and minds" of the people of Malaya and to remove the fish (the insurgents) from the water (the people). Coupled with these innovations, and probably one of the keys to their effectiveness, was a limitation on the use of overwhelming firepower and the subordination of the military to the political.

In contrast, the author effectively makes the case that the US Army in Vietnam failed to develop as a learning organization and, in fact, actively resisted the adaptations necessary to develop an effective counterinsurgency doctrine. MAJ Nagl cites ample evidence that the military refused to listen to its own civilian leadership when it called for a more politically-sensitive approach to counterinsurgency, that it rejected internal studies pointing out its own flaws and refused to learn from them, and that it did not foster tactical and operational innovation but, instead, relied upon superior technology and overwhelming firepower even when these could prove counterproductive. The US approach largely lost the "hearts and minds" of the people and lost the war politically and, ultimately, militarily.

The depth of the author's research is evident in every chapter and should satisfy the rigor of academia while, at the same time, the writing style is clear, concise, and leaves little doubt as to the author's reasoning. Overall, MAJ Nagl has made an impressive contribution to the study of organizational learning that will prove valuable to anyone interested in these concepts as well as those for whom there is no substitute for victory. This study is especially relevant today. One must wonder, for example, if the Army, 10 years after Mogadishu, has developed effective doctrine for fighting on urban terrain in the developing world or has merely chosen to avoid that fight and to remain unprepared for an enemy who wisely uses terrain to avoid superior technology and firepower. To be successful in an age of "small" wars, Nagl concludes that the Army "will have to make the ability to learn to deal with messy, uncomfortable situations an integral part" of its organizational culture. It must, per T.E. Lawrence, be comfortable eating soup with a knife.